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Abstract
Background: Priority setting in publicly financed healthcare systems should be guided by ethical norms and other 
considerations viewed as socially valuable, and we find several different approaches for how such norms and considerations 
guide priorities in healthcare decision-making. Common to many of these approaches is that interventions are ranked 
in relation to each other, following the application of these norms and considerations, and that this ranking list is then 
translated into a coverage scheme. In the literature we find at least two different views on how a ranking list should be 
translated into coverage schemes: (1) rationing from the bottom where everything below a certain ranking order is 
rationed; or (2) a relative degree of coverage, where higher ranked interventions are given a relatively larger share of 
resources than lower ranked interventions according to some “curve of coverage.” 
Methods: The aim of this article is to provide a normative analysis of how the background set of ethical norms and other 
considerations support these two views. 
Results: The result of the analysis shows that rationing from the bottom generally gets stronger support if taking 
background ethical norms seriously, and with regard to the extent the ranking succeeds in realising these norms. 
However, in non-ideal rankings and to handle variations at individual patient level, there is support for relative coverage 
at the borderline of what could be covered. A more general relative coverage curve could also be supported if there is a 
need to generate resources for the healthcare system, by getting patients back into production and getting acceptance for 
priority setting decisions. 
Conclusion: Hence, different types of reasons support different deviations from rationing from the bottom. And it 
should be noted that the two latter reasons will imply a cost in terms of not living up to the background set of ethical 
norms.
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Implications for policy makers
The results of this theoretical analysis could benefit policy makers by:
• Showing that how priority setting and ranking of interventions are translated into coverage schemes will have implications for whether 
background ethical norms are implemented or not.
• Providing theoretical models and reasons to develop coverage schemes for ranking lists that are in line with the central ethical norms and other 
considerations of the healthcare system.
• Pointing to the fact that some coverage schemes and the associated reasons will be bought at the cost of not being able to fully implement the 
background ethical norms, that in essence there is an “ethical opportunity cost.”
Implications for the public
The implications for the public are of a more indirect nature, but the coverage schemes used will obviously affect the public. It has been argued 
that the extent to which the public should be involved in decision-making concerning priority setting, should primarily be involvement at a policy 
level. Being clear over how different policies concerning coverage schemes related to the background set of ethical norms and considerations (over 
which they would then also have an influence), will be important input to their decisions. In communication with the public concerning different 
rationing decisions, it might be important to be able to point to the fact that if they also condition their acceptance on some access to lower ranked 
interventions – this will be bought at the cost of actually fulfilling the background set of ethical norms.
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Politics and Power in Global Health: The Constituting Role 
of Conflicts
Comment on “Navigating Between Stealth Advocacy and Unconscious Dogmatism: The 
Challenge of Researching th  Norms, Politics and Power of Global Health”
Clemet Askheim, Kristi  Heggen, Eivind Engebretsen*
Abstract
In a recent article, Gorik Ooms has drawn attention to the normative underpinnings of the politics of 
global health. We claim that Ooms is indirectly submitting to a liberal conception of politics by framing 
the politics of global health as a question of individual morality. Drawing on the theoretical works of 
Chantal Mouffe, we introduce a conflictual concept of the political as an alternative to Ooms’ conception. 
Using controversies surrounding medical treatment of AIDS patients in developing countries as a case we 
underline the opportunity for political changes, through political articulation of an issue, and collective 
mobiliz tion based on such  articulation.
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In a ecen  contribution to the ongoing debate about the rol  of power in global health, Gorik Ooms emphasizes the normative underpinnings of global health politics. 
He i entifies three related problems: (1) a lack of agreement 
among global health scholars about their normative premises, 
(2) a lack of agreement between global health scholars and 
policy-makers regarding the normative premises underlying 
policy, and (3) a lack of willingness among scholars to 
clearly state their normative premises and assumptions. This 
c fusion is for Ooms one of the explanations “why global 
health’s policy-m kers are not impl ment ng the knowledge 
ge erated by global h alth’s empirical scholars.” He c lls 
for greater unity between scholars and between scholars 
and policy-makers, concerning the underlying normative 
premises and greater openness when it comes to advocacy.1
We commend the effort to reinstate power and politics in 
global health and agree that “a purely empirical evidence-based 
approach is a fiction,” and that such a view risks covering up 
“the role of politics and power.” But by contrasting this fiction 
with global health research “driven by crises, hot issues, and 
the concerns of organized interest groups,” as a “path we are 
trying to move away from,” Ooms is submitting to a liberal 
conception of politics he implicitly criticizes the outcomes 
of.1 A liberal view of politics evades the constituting role of 
conflicts and reduces it to either a rationalistic, economic 
calculation, or an individual question of moral norms. This 
is echoed in Ooms when he states that “it is not possible to 
discuss the politics of global health without discussing the 
normative premises behind the politics.”1 But what if we 
take the political as the primary level and the normative as 
secondary, or d rived from the political?
That is what we will try to do here, by introducing an 
alternative conceptualization of the political and hence free 
us from the “false dilemma” Ooms also wants to escape. 
“Although constructivists have emphasized how underlying 
normative structures constitute actors’ identities and 
interests, they have rarely treated these normative structures 
themselves as defined and infused by power, or emphasized 
how constitutive effects also are expressions of power.”2 This 
is the starting point for the political theorist Chantal Mouffe, 
n  her respons is to develop an onto ogical conception of 
the political, where “the political belongs to our ontological 
condition.”3 According to Mouffe, society is instituted 
through conflict. “[B]y ‘the political’ I mean the dimension of 
antagonism which I take to be constitutive of human societies, 
while by ‘politics’ I mean the set of practices and institutions 
through which an order is created, organizing human 
coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided by the 
political.”3 An issue or a topic needs to be contested to become 
political, and such a contestation concerns public action and 
creates a ‘we’ and ‘they’ form of collective identification. But 
the fixation of social relations is partial and precarious, since 
antagonism is an ever present possibility. To politicize an issue 
and be able to mobilize support, one needs to represent the 
world in a conflictual manner “with opposed camps with 
which people can identify.”3 
Ooms uses the case of “increasing international aid spending 
on AIDS treatment” to illustrate his point.1 He frames the 
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Background 
Due to demographic and medical developments, increased 
patient expectations, and situations of fiscal austerity, 
healthcare priority setting should top the agenda of most 
healthcare systems. This is especially true when it concerns 
healthcare systems in welfare states where there is generally a 
demand for equitable use of resources, and the distribution of 
resources is not solely guided by individual patient preferences. 
But, generally, in any healthcare system with societal 
coverage, where available resources do not match the existent 
healthcare needs, priority setting will have to be achieved – be 
it the prioritisation of innovative and costly interventions in a 
wealthy country like Sweden, or of interventions essential to 
public health in rural parts of Africa.1
Defining healthcare priority setting, in this context, as the 
explicit ranking of healthcare interventions to guide resource 
distribution, implies that priority setting should in turn be 
guided by a set of relevant considerations. There is great 
diversity as to what exactly this set should include, even if 
different suggestions tend to overlap. However, all explicit 
suggestions include a number of ethical considerations at the 
core of this set (see for example Persad et al for an overview).2 
These ethical considerations can be expressed in terms of 
legally implemented, ethical principles or criteria for priority 
setting (such as the principles of human dignity, needs-
solidarity and cost-effectiveness in the Swedish context,1 or 
the criteria of benefit, resources and severity in the Norwegian 
context3,4), a specific tool including a number of ethically 
motivated criteria (eg, the use of the multi-criteria analysis 
tool EVIDEM in Catalonia),5,6 a specific process following 
processual criteria with the aim of creating a beneficial 
environment for making ethically relevant considerations (eg, 
following the standards of accountability for reasonableness in 
priority setting in HIV/AIDS-control in West Java Indonesia 
etc),7,8 or a combination of approaches. Besides the ethical 
core considerations, the set of considerations might also 
include references to more pragmatic considerations, such 
as whether budget impact will allow a specific intervention 
to be reimbursed, even given a high ranking. New biological 
drugs for hepatitis C are a current example where a number 
of ethical considerations support their use, but where budget 
impact hinders or delays implementation of such use.9
Regardless of approach, explicit priority setting should be 
guided by a set of relevant considerations, with a core of 
ethical considerations. Let me return to this below. There 
are different ways to prioritise within healthcare. It can be 
done by looking at single new technologies and deciding 
whether they should be prioritised for funding given the 
relevant considerations, exemplified by when the National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) in England 
assess new healthcare interventions and provide clinical 
guidelines.10 Another approach is to look at a set of healthcare 
interventions or condition/intervention-pairs[1], and try to 
translate the relevant considerations into a priority ranking 
between these different interventions. This is exemplified by 
the Oregon priority list,11 or the Swedish national guidelines 
within different disease areas.12 It is upon this latter approach 
that I will focus in this article.
When the ranking is done, the resulting ranking list needs 
to be implemented in a reimbursement or coverage scheme 
(henceforth coverage scheme) within the healthcare 
system. Literature presents at least two different ways[2] of 
implementing or translating a ranking list into a coverage 
scheme.3,11
1)	 The Oregon list was an example of the idea of starting 
from the top of the list going down, and covering 
everything until the budget limit is reached. To the 
extent that available resources do not cover everything 
on the list, the technologies below the budget line should 
be rationed[3]. Another way to express this is to say that 
we should ration from the bottom of the ranking list 
(RATBOT for short). 
2)	 The Swedish ethics platform for priority setting and 
the Swedish national guidelines recommend another 
approach, here labelled relative degree of needs coverage 
or more generally, relative resource coverage (RELCOV 
for short). This idea implies that the higher the rank, 
the more relative the coverage, and vice versa for what is 
lower on the ranking list. 
The two ideas will be explained in more detail further into 
the article.
These ideas on how a ranking list should be translated into 
resource coverage within the healthcare system, raise a 
normative question: Are they normatively equivalent or are 
there normative reasons to prefer one before the other? In 
previous articles, unacceptable trade-offs in priority setting 
have been identified,1 but no analysis comparing these 
two systematic methods of translating a ranking list into a 
coverage scheme is available in the scientific literature. The 
aim of this article is to analyse whether there are normative 
reasons to prefer either RATBOT or RELCOV. Before moving 
into the analysis, let me first elaborate on how a ranking list is 
created from a set of considerations.
From a Set of Considerations to a Ranking List
In order to further analyse the normative implications of 
different coverage schemes, it is important to elaborate on 
how a ranking list should (ideally) be arrived at given an 
explicit set of considerations. Regardless of whether a set of 
explicit principles or criteria is used, or whether we follow 
a formalised process where the set of considerations arises 
more dynamically, ideally these considerations should be 
applied consistently. This implies that there should be a 
consistent balancing of the different considerations resulting 
in a consistent ranking of interventions. Obviously, this means 
that if different interventions get the same values on each 
consideration, they should result in the same ranking. It also 
means that if a specific consideration has a certain importance 
for one intervention, it should also have similar importance 
for other interventions. To illustrate, if severity is part of our 
considerations and we claim that great severity is of major 
importance for giving a high ranking to one intervention, 
we cannot claim that great severity is of minor importance 
in relation to another intervention. Of course, severity can be 
differently balanced taking other considerations into account. 
If cost-effectiveness is one of the relevant considerations, great 
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severity and low cost-effectiveness can result in a low ranking, 
but that does not downplay the importance of severity, and 
another intervention with equally low cost-effectiveness 
and lower severity should result in an even lower ranking. 
Generally, in an ideal ranking, we will have applied the set 
of considerations consistently, and all interventions ranked 1 
will then be more important to cover (given our balanced set 
of considerations), than all interventions ranked 2 etc. This is 
true, regardless of what the set of considerations we base our 
ranking on contains. Does this also imply that it is ethically 
more important to cover what is ranked 1 than what is ranked 
2, and so on?
As indicated above, even if ethical considerations form 
the core, the set of priority setting considerations can also 
include other considerations of a more pragmatic nature. 
To some extent, this is dependent on how we define ethical 
considerations. In this context, ethical considerations are 
all considerations that are related to some value of human 
life. This implies, for example, that effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness considerations are ethical considerations, since 
they concern whether and how value is distributed to people. 
The same goes for evidential concerns, eg, whether there is 
ample evidence of the effectiveness of the intervention etc, 
since this will affect the potential to benefit, whether use of 
resources on the intervention risk being wasted, how patients 
should be able to make an informed decision etc.13 If we 
are uncomfortable using the term ethically important, we 
might instead prefer the term socially valuable, ie, the set of 
considerations that should guide priority setting should be a 
set reflecting what are considered to be socially relevant values 
in the society or context at hand. If we add more pragmatic 
concerns to our set of considerations, they should be added 
because they reflect obstacles to implementing a specific 
ranking, which at least in the short run is insurmountable, eg, 
access to available resources such as professional competence. 
Essentially, this means that what is ranked 1, given an ideal 
ranking exercise, will also be more socially valuable than what 
is ranked 2 etc. 
Different Coverage Schemes: RATBOT and RELCOV
Before analysing how different coverage schemes would fare 
in relation to such an ideal, it is also necessary to describe in 
more detail the implications of the two versions of coverage 
above. To illustrate the reasoning in this article let us initially 
assume that decision-makers are ranking five different 
interventions (A-E), needed by 100 patients, at the total cost 
of 100 000 € per intervention. The ranking follows the set 
of relevant considerations established within the healthcare 
system at hand. Let us also assume that the available budget 
amounts to 300 000 €. RATBOT would then imply that 
interventions A-C are funded and D-E are rationed (Table 1).
RELCOV, on the other hand, could follow a number of 
different coverage curves. Table 2 illustrates a situation 
in which the ranking from 1-5 is translated into a curve of 
coverage with the following five steps: 100% - 80% - 60% - 
40% - 20%.
It could be that instead of patients losing out on the 
full intervention, it is diluted so that patients in need of 
intervention B only get 80% thereof (if divisible). If so, it might 
also be envisioned that patients co-pay the resulting 20% or 
whatever percentage is outstanding. However, since the focus 
here is on what should have societal coverage, this possible 
complication will be ignored. There are obviously a number 
of possible coverage curves here, and one might claim that 
RATBOT is a specific version of RELCOV, following a certain 
coverage curve. 
Methods
In the article, normative analysis following the methodology 
of reflective equilibrium is used.14 This implies that different 
normative standpoints are analysed to see whether they can be 
consistently held, ie, whether a so-called reflective equilibrium 
can be reached in relation to different combinations of these 
standpoints. To do so, the suggested standpoints need to be 
clarified, requiring enough degree of conceptual clarification. 
The method of reflective equilibrium can be applied in 
different ways. One way is to start with a well-established set 
of normative considerations or principles, and then analyse 
whether suggested applied actions are consistent with this set 
of principles, eg, analysing whether suggestions for restricting 
public coverage of uterus transplantation is consistent with 
established principles for priority setting, together with 
principles for patient and parental autonomy etc.15 Another 
way is to analyse whether two or more different standpoints 
can be consistently held, regardless of whether these are 
well-established or not. With this latter approach, we need 
not take a definitive stand on whether we should accept 
any of the suggested standpoints, but can draw conclusions 
as to whether we could consistently hold them. This is the 
approach used in this article. Specifically, this implies that 
RATBOT and RELCOV will be analysed in relation to the 
set of considerations that should guide priority setting, in an 
attempt to establish that regardless of what exactly this set 
includes, RATBOT will be supported. Following this, different 
explicit complementary reasons for using RELCOV that could 
be added to the original set of considerations will be analysed 
Table 1. A Ranking of Five Different Interventions Applying Rationing From 
the Bottom
Ranking Intervention No. of Patients Getting Treatment Total Cost (€)
1 A 100 100 000
2 B 100 100 000
3 C 100 100 000
4 D 0 0
5 E 0 0
Table 2. A Ranking of Five Different Interventions Applying a Relative 
Degree of Coverage
Ranking Intervention No. of Patients Getting Treatment Total Cost (€)
1 A 100 100 000
2 B 80 80 000
3 C 60 60 000
4 D 40 40 000
5 E 20 20 000
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to see whether a reflective equilibrium can be reached. In 
doing so, RELCOV will be modified to see whether versions 
of RELCOV that come closer to RATBOT will better achieve 
a reflective equilibrium.
Results
Ideal Rankings, RATBOT and RELCOV
Ideally interventions ranked at level 1 are more socially 
valuable than those ranked at level 2 etc. With that in 
mind, are RATBOT and RELCOV normatively equal? In 
the RATBOT case all that is funded (A-C) is socially more 
valuable than all that is unfunded (D-E). In the RELCOV 
case, access is restricted for 20 patients in need of intervention 
B, and for 40 patients in need of intervention C. This is in 
order to enable access for 40 patients in need of intervention 
D, and 20 patients in need of intervention E. In other words - 
access to more socially valuable interventions is restricted in 
order to enable access to interventions of lesser social value. 
Hence, the combination of an ideal ranking list (and the 
values behind this) and RATBOT, is more consistent than the 
combination of such a ranking list with RELCOV. Expressed 
in other words, RELCOV does not seem to follow or adhere to 
the social values behind the ranking, but rather follows some 
other set of values. We reach a better reflective equilibrium 
between ideal ranking lists (and the value set behind these), 
and RATBOT, than between ideal ranking lists and RELCOV. 
I will boldly claim that this is true regardless of the coverage 
curve of RELCOV.
Is this the end of story, then, indicating RELCOV should not be 
used? Not necessarily. In the following, reasons for supporting 
the use of RELCOV instead of RATBOT will be explored to 
see if we can find an expanded set of considerations, in which 
ranking lists and RELCOV could be harmonised. Norheim 
presents a similar argument in discussing unacceptable trade-
offs in universal health coverage, where central public health 
interventions make way for less essential interventions.1
Non-ideal Ranking
Above, an ideal ranking list was assumed, ie, a list in which 
the background set of considerations has been consistently 
applied, implying that everything with a higher rank is de 
facto more socially valuable than anything with a lower 
rank. In a real priority setting situation, this might not (or 
rather, is unlikely to) be the case. There are several possible 
reasons for this. First, the set of considerations might be 
conceptually unclear.16 If severity and unmet needs are part 
of our set of considerations, how should these concepts be 
understood? Is there a conceptual overlap that requires to 
be taken into account, eg, if a need is unmet, does it also 
imply that the severity of the condition is unaffected, and so 
on? Second, there might be lack of knowledge to fully assess 
the different parts of our set of considerations even given a 
certain conceptualisation. For example, how do we measure 
different aspects of severity? Third, different parts of our set 
of considerations might be vague or even indeterminate in 
relation to each other. If a condition is severe but with access 
to moderately effective treatment, and another condition 
is less severe but there is an unmet need with no access to 
interventions, how should these be ranked in relation to each 
other?17 And fourth, the ranking might be inconsistent. We 
might not be meticulous enough or allow other concerns such 
as idiosyncratic personal or professional interests to come 
into play. 
If we accept that these factors might influence the ranking, 
the ranking list might actually look like it does in Table 3. 
Here it is assumed that in the ideal world all A-interventions 
are more socially valuable than all B-interventions etc. Hence, 
the reason why B1 ends up at ranking 1, A4 at ranking 2 etc, 
depends on a combination of the above (and other possible) 
disturbing factors. If we got it right given our considerations, 
A4 should have ranking 1, B1 should have ranking 2 and 
so on.
In this example (Table 3), the ranking is somewhat, but not 
totally, wrong. Most of the socially more valuable interventions 
are ranked above less socially valuable interventions. If this is 
likely to be closer to real world rankings, is this a reason to 
use RELCOV rather than RATBOT? Consider a developed 
example in Table 4[4].
With use of RATBOT, everything ranked 1-3 should get 
coverage, and everything ranked 4-5 will be rationed. Given 
our set of considerations and the fact that we mistakenly 
rank some interventions higher or lower than what this set 
implies, intervention D1 gets coverage and intervention 
C4 gets rationed, contrary to what the background set of 
considerations implies. It is assumed that which of the 
interventions at each level are ranked contrary to our set of 
considerations, is unknown, ie, we do not know that D1 and 
C4 have been prioritised wrongly.
Expressed in terms of our methodology, in this situation we 
have not reached a full reflective equilibrium where all the 
different aspects of our situation consistently harmonise 
with each other. Would the use of RELCOV result in a more 
consistent situation? Consider the use of RELCOV (following 
the coverage curve in Table 2), in Table 5.
That is, with luck, the 8 patients losing out on interventions at 
level 2 will be the ones in need of intervention C1 – the lowest 
ranked intervention at level 2 (from an ideal perspective). 
With less luck they might instead be patients in need of 
intervention A4 (the highest ranked intervention from an 
ideal perspective), who will lose out. Likewise moving down 
the ranking list. 
To minimise the risk of ending up in the least lucky situation, 
one possible way is to dilute interventions so that all patients 
at level 2 get only 80% of the intervention, and so on. However, 
in many cases that solution is not feasible (eg, when it comes 
to surgical interventions, drug dosage etc). More importantly, 
if only 80% of the intervention is offered, the effect and cost-
Table 3. Distribution of Different Interventions in a Non-ideal Ranking
Ranking Interventions
1 A1, A2, A3, B1
2 A4, B2, B3, C1
3 B4, C2, C3, D1
4 C4, D2, D3, E1
5 D4, E2, E3, E4
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effectiveness will be different. It might also affect other relevant 
aspects of the intervention, which should then have had a 
different ranking. Moreover, with this coverage curve, at level 
5, patients are still given access to interventions less important 
than those that patients get access to in the RATBOT case. 
Hence, it seems the use of RELCOV, even given non-ideal 
rankings, would not result in a more consistent situation, 
given our background set of considerations. With RATBOT, 
to the extent we actually have managed to get relatively more 
socially valuable interventions at the upper part of the ranking 
list, and relatively less socially valuable interventions at the 
lower part, relatively more socially valuable interventions will 
be funded than less valuable ones. Hence, even given a non-
ideal ranking situation, it seems reasonable to use RATBOT 
rather than RELCOV (at least given the type of curve in Table 
5 above, with relative coverage of all ranking levels). 
A specific type of RELCOV could however be envisaged, with 
only relative coverage at the borderline. Consider the example 
in Table 6.
In this case the risk of not funding socially valuable 
interventions at the cost of less socially valuable ones, is 
minimised. In a sense, RELCOV is here closing in on RATBOT. 
However, the problem of luck remains. That is, assuming that 
it is unknown which interventions we have assessed wrongly, 
we might end up funding the wrong interventions at level 3 
and 4. In the least lucky scenario, 16 interventions in Table 6 
will be wrongly funded. In the RATBOT scenario, where all 
interventions at level 1-3 and no interventions at level 4-5 are 
funded, 20 interventions will be wrongly funded. So, it seems 
a RELCOV approach with overlap at the borderline might, in 
some cases, be better than a RATBOT approach in the sense 
of being more consistent with our background considerations. 
However, we will have difficulty knowing when this is the 
case. If the coverage curve would have funded 30 of 40 and 
10 of 40 at each side of the borderline, instead of 32 of 40 and 
8 of 40, worst case scenario in RELCOV would have equalled 
RATBOT. Still, it might be argued that there is a chance that 
we fund less interventions wrongly (since we might be lucky 
and not end up with the worst case scenario) with RELCOV, 
than with RATBOT (which will give a certain outcome of 20 
wrongly funded interventions).
Concluding this section, the fact that the ranking lists are not 
ideal could provide some reason to have a RELCOV approach 
with overlap just at the borderline. However, we will have 
difficulty knowing exactly how to set that overlap, in order to 
do better than with the RATBOT approach. 
Table 4. A Non-ideal Ranking of Interventions Related to Patient and Cost
Ranking Interventions No. of Patients in Need of Each 
Intervention
Total Number of Patients at Each 
Ranking Level
Total Cost (€) 
(2500 € per Intervention)
1 A1, A2, A3, B1 10 40 100 000
2 A4, B2, B3, C1 10 40 100 000
3 B4, C2, C3, D1 10 40 100 000
4 C4, D2, D3, E1 10 40 100 000
5 D4, E2, E3, E4 10 40 100 000
Table 5. A Non-ideal Ranking Using a Relative Degree of Coverage
Ranking Interventions No. of Patients Getting 
Access
Total Cost (€)
1 A1, A2, A3, B1 40 of 40 100 000
2 A4, B2, B3, C1 32 of 40 80 000
3 B4, C2, C3, D1 24 of 40 60 000
4 C4, D2, D3, E1 16 of 40 40 000
5 D4, E2, E3, E4 8 of 40 20 000
Table 6. A Non-ideal Ranking With a Relative Degree of Coverage at the 
Borderline
Ranking Interventions No. of Patients Getting 
Access
Total Cost (€)
1 A1, A2, A3, B1 40 of 40 100 000
2 A4, B2, B3, C1 40 of 40 100 000
3 B4, C2, C3, D1 32 of 40 80 000
4 C4, D2, D3, E1 8 of 40 20 000
5 D4, E2, E3, E4 0 of 40 0
Having an Opportunity to Receive Treatment 
It has been suggested that one reason for using RELCOV 
is that all patients (regardless of condition), should at least 
have some opportunity to get treatment[5]. In the literature 
on equity in healthcare this is expressed in terms of equal 
opportunity. This idea might be interpreted in terms of both 
equal opportunity to access treatment and equal opportunity 
for health or quality of life (QoL).18 
In essence, the idea of equal opportunity for health or QoL 
seems to take need or severity into account, if the idea is 
interpreted in terms of patients being entitled to levels of 
health equal to that of other individuals in society. Thereby 
the idea is likely to already be included in the set of ethical 
concerns guiding the priority setting above. 
Let us therefore focus on the idea of equal opportunity for 
treatment. This idea might be interpreted as allowing all 
patients equal opportunity to get existing interventions, 
whatever the condition or treatment characteristics. This 
implies that all available interventions should be offered. If 
so, prioritising between interventions is not an option. Such 
an approach obviously begs the questions, and it seems more 
reasonable to interpret the idea of equal opportunity as a side-
constraint on other ethical concerns, ie, as a formal equality 
constraint. Hence, two patients or groups with equally 
severe conditions, and similarly effective and cost-effective 
interventions (and similar in other ethically relevant respects), 
should have equal opportunity to access treatment.19
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With such an interpretation it turns out the norm with regard 
to equal opportunity, would support RATBOT rather than 
RELCOV, given ideal ranking. With RATBOT, all patients 
needing interventions at a certain ranking, will either have or 
not have access to it, ie, equal opportunity[6]. With RELCOV, 
a fraction of the patients needing interventions at the same 
ranking, will get access, ie, unequal opportunity. If instead, 
the ranking is non-ideal, we have a similar situation that has 
been dealt with in the previous section, with some support for 
RELCOV at the borderline but with insecurity as to whether 
we have improved the situation or not.
So, is there another idea here? One such idea could be that 
regardless of how interventions are ranked, patients should 
have some opportunity to have access to them, though the 
opportunity would diminish with lower rank. RELCOV 
could be a way to implement such a view. Can we find 
a reasonable ethical rationale behind such an idea? The 
rationale could hardly be equity. Equity should be a central 
aspect of the ethical concerns, taken into account and built 
into our ranking. Thus, it seems unfair to give opportunity to 
access treatment for patients in need of less socially valuable 
interventions, at the cost of access to patients in need of more 
valuable interventions. 
Another idea could be hope. That is, it is important that all 
patients, regardless of situation, have some hope of treatment. 
However, use of RELCOV would imply buying hope for 
patients with conditions at the lower end of the ranking, at 
the cost of denying patients at the high ranking end access to 
more socially valuable interventions, and thereby somewhat 
lessen hope for those in need of these interventions. Moreover, 
if hope is considered important enough to trump the ethically 
relevant concerns at the base of our ranking, it is better from 
the perspective of consistency to build considerations of hope 
into the original set of ethical and other concerns guiding the 
ranking in the first place.
In conclusion, it is hard to find that providing patients with the 
opportunity to access existing treatment is a reason to support 
RELCOV. On the contrary, it seems reference to opportunity 
to access treatment, whether for equal opportunity or hope, 
will support RATBOT and hence we achieve our reflective 
equilibrium to a greater extent in the latter than in the former 
case.
Priority Setting at Group and Individual Levels
Another idea to defend the use of RELCOV, is the need to 
manage inconsistencies between the group and individual 
levels of priority setting[7]. Normally, priority setting in 
healthcare is done at group level, as illustrated by the examples 
above. This will imply that all ethical and other considerations 
at the base of our ranking will be about a group of patients in 
need of a specific intervention. 
For example, to the extent that severity of condition is taken 
into account, it is understood as the mean or median severity 
of the group, and likewise effectiveness etc. Individual 
patients might differ from the group, implying that the 
interventions should have been ranked differently when 
offered to them. Once again this can be illustrated by the 
ranking list in Figure.
As illustrated in Figure, a patient in need of intervention D, 
can have a profile that would motivate a ranking 3 rather than 
4, ie, for every patient group in need of a specific technology 
there are individual outliers in both directions that would 
motivate a higher or lower ranking. For example, they have a 
higher severity, or better effect of treatment or other features 
that would motivate a different ranking. Then RATBOT 
will block access to treatment for such patients. Would this 
problem be solved by use of RELCOV, or are there other ways 
to solve or handle it? 
With RELCOV, there would be some access to treatments 
at all ranking levels. Access could in turn be limited only to 
patients that deviate from the ranking profile of their group 
mean, ie, that are identified at the individual level as having 
a higher ranking given the specific characteristics of said 
patients. Likewise, since in every group there will be patients 
and interventions with a lower rank at the individual level, 
they could be the ones who pay the cost at every ranking level. 
This seems reasonable enough. 
However, first, it might be argued that RELCOV will be 
too indistinct as an instrument to handle this problem, 
and that too many resources are assigned for lower ranked 
interventions, just in case, with a corresponding cost for higher 
ranked interventions. The longer a patient group is from the 
borderline of what is funded with the RATBOT approach, the 
less likely it is that there is such great individual variation that 
individual patients should be ranked above the funding limit. 
Hence, the problem mainly arises at the borderline between 
what is funded and what is not with RATBOT. If there is such 
great variation at the individual level to motivate a RELCOV 
approach that assigns large amounts of resources just in case - 
we might question the use of ranking lists at all.
Second, to the extent that sub-groups of patients where the 
intervention would get a different ranking could be identified, 
this would preferably be done beforehand. 
Third, if it is impossible to identify such sub-groups 
beforehand (or to judge the size of the groups and thereby 
the resources needed), it seems that a more limited version 
of RELCOV, allowing for some overlap at the borderline, 
would generally be a better alternative. Consider Figure again.
In this case interventions A and B are funded to 100%, 
intervention C is funded to 90 % implying that the patients in 
need of C but having a lower ranking than the rest of group 
l (if possible to identify), should not receive the technology, 
and 10% of patients at level 4 should receive funding since 
some of these patient (once again if identifiable), should have 
a higher ranking.
Figure. A ranking of interventions where individual patients in a patient 
group are distributed over more than one ranking level together with 
relative coverage at the borderline.
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In conclusion, the argument from the need to distinguish 
between the group and individual level, could lend some 
support for a RELCOV approach. However, caution is needed 
regarding which curve of coverage to use in order to balance 
the different considerations in our reflective equilibrium, 
and it seems reasonable to use a RELCOV curve close to the 
RATBOT approach. This is unless there are reasons to believe 
that our ranking lists are far off the mark. In which case, 
whether adjustments could be made by looking at sub-groups 
to get more apt ranking lists should be explored. If this is 
impossible, the use of ranking lists could come into question.
The Need to Generate Resources for Healthcare
Another argument that could support the use of RELCOV 
is the need to generate resources for healthcare. Such a 
consideration can be part of the original set of considerations 
to take into account when deciding on a ranking, eg, by 
integrating a societal perspective in the cost-effectiveness 
assessment taking productivity effects into account.20 However, 
due to ethical reasons this might not be viable. For example, 
in the Swedish context, the ethical principles guiding priority 
setting, explicitly claim that social situation or chronological 
age are not relevant considerations to take into account. This 
has been taken to imply that one should be careful when 
integrating productivity effects in the cost-effectiveness 
assessment – since the risk is of benefiting younger age groups 
with the potential to return to work, at the expense of older 
age groups or groups without such potential[8]. Hence, for 
the sake of argument, let us assume that the need to generate 
resources for healthcare is not part of the background set of 
considerations. Could RELCOV then be a way to balance this 
after the ranking is decided?
First, why would RELCOV be a better option than RATBOT 
here? Depending of course on the exact set of considerations at 
the bottom of our ranking, and the extent to which severity is 
taken into account – patients at the higher end of our ranking 
are likely to be in a worse state than patients at the lower end. 
This also, generally, implies that patients at the lower end 
might have a better chance to return to work after treatment, 
than patients at the higher end. Prioritising resources to 
patients at the higher end, at the expense of patients at the 
lower end, is therefore likely to be less beneficial to societal 
production than if resources are spent on patients at the lower 
end of the ranking. For example, patients with cancer, chronic 
heart failure, amyotrophic lateral (ALS) etc are likely to be 
highly represented at the higher end of the ranking, whilst 
patients with back pain, minor orthopaedic conditions, minor 
psychiatric illnesses etc, might be highly represented at the 
lower end. With interventions, the latter group might return 
to work, which might not be the case for the former group if 
the conditions are serious enough. If so, and if resources are 
not sufficient to cover healthcare for all technologies on the 
ranking list, we might need to take resources from more highly 
ranked alternatives to sponsor lower ranked alternatives in 
order to have a continuous stream of resources to distribute. 
This appears to be an example of applying RELCOV. Unless 
the healthcare system can contribute to the generation of 
resources for distribution, eventually even fewer patients 
will get access to relevant interventions. In this sense, from a 
systems perspective, it can be argued that applying RELCOV 
to our ranking lists will result in a more reasonable reflective 
equilibrium, all things considered, than RATBOT.
Hence, the need to generate resources for healthcare through 
getting people back into production could provide a reason to 
support the use of RELCOV.
The Need to Get Public Support for Priority Setting
Another argument to support RELCOV could be the need to 
get public support for the rationing decisions made. Even if 
there is a general understanding by the public of the need to 
make rationing decisions, these decisions are more difficult 
to accept for those affected.21,22 Depending once again on 
the exact set of considerations used to formulate a ranking 
list, different patient groups will be differently represented 
on ranking lists following these considerations. Following 
the analysis in the former section, people with less severe 
conditions are likely to be overrepresented at the lower end of 
the rankings, and thus interventions for them are potentially 
rationed with RATBOT. Using RATBOT will imply that these 
patient groups will lose out on publicly financed treatment, 
and if decision-makers are transparent about this, they will 
know that they do not have any chance of getting treatment 
through public channels. On the other hand, with RELCOV, 
following a distributional curve such as the one in Table 2, all 
groups will have some chance of getting access to treatment. 
It might be easier to get public acceptance for a rationing 
scheme where a person knows that from whatever condition 
they suffer – they will have some chance of getting treatment. 
Hence, such a consideration will probably lend support to a 
RELCOV approach before a RATBOT approach. Moreover, 
using a RATBOT approach will generally imply that patient 
groups suffering from less severe conditions are less prone 
to get treatment in a rationing situation, all things being 
equal. These groups are generally in a better position to voice 
discontent about not receiving treatment and might thereby 
contribute to a negative attitude towards the healthcare sector 
and its priority setting. The need to generate support for 
priority setting in society could therefore lend some support 
for a RELCOV approach.
Discussion
The above analysis shows first, if the ranking is an ideal 
ranking or close to an ideal ranking, RATBOT will get 
strongest support as the coverage scheme best in line with the 
ranking. However, since we might have reason to expect that, 
in different ways, our ranking digresses from what is ideal, we 
see that this could give us some reason to prefer RELCOV, if 
we use a coverage curve or relative distribution which allows 
for overlap at the borderline for what should and what should 
not have been covered with RATBOT. In essence, a RELCOV 
distribution that does not differ very much from RATBOT. 
This, since it was assumed that the ranking is still fairly well 
in line with our background set of considerations.
But what if our ranking is even further off the mark? Would 
the suggested RELCOV distribution exemplified in Table 2 
not be a way to balance that? First, the more we get it wrong, 
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the less value there will be in doing ranking exercises. That is, 
if we are that far off the mark, it might be meaningless to do 
ranking exercises at all – in that ranking is a way to implement 
the background set of considerations. Second, however, a 
vague or non-ideal ranking list would be combined with a 
curve of coverage that might enhance the ethically wrong or 
non-ideal ranking (depending on whether we are lucky or 
unlucky). Hence, it would be difficult to see RELCOV as the 
solution to balancing greater problems with ranking if we take 
our background set of considerations seriously.
It was not found that opportunity for treatment, in the sense 
that would support RELCOV, could possibly harmonise with 
our background set of considerations, since opportunity 
for lower ranked interventions are bought at the cost of 
opportunity for higher ranked interventions – in a sense self-
defeating. However, the fact that the ranking is normally done 
at group level with a need to handle individual variations 
within this group, did provide some support for RELCOV. 
But as before, this is a blunt instrument and the more we are 
able to specify sub-groups and rank them according to their 
specific characteristics – the better the harmonisation with the 
rest of our considerations. If this is not possible, RELCOV at 
the borderline of what our resources can cover, could provide 
the opportunity to make adjustments at the individual level 
and still following the background set.
A more general reason to support RELCOV could be the 
need to generate resources for the healthcare system, as we 
saw above. Distinct from the non-ideal rankings, such a 
reason would probably support a more expanded version 
of RELCOV that not only overlaps at the borderline, but 
provides coverage for the groups most likely to get back into 
work, wherever they are on the ranking list. If we agree that the 
system’s ability to generate resources for distribution should 
be part of our reflective equilibrium, is applying RELCOV to a 
ranking list, without such considerations among the basic set 
of considerations, the best approach? 
First, this seems to be a case of “double standards,” ie, there 
is a set of official norms and considerations to guide the 
ranking and then, when applying this ranking in practice, a 
different set of principles is introduced, because the first set 
is (socially) untenable. To exemplify, assume that we should 
consider severity of condition and cost-effectiveness in 
priority setting. These two factors are given internal weight 
so that the more severe a condition, the less cost-effective the 
intervention used for treatment has to be. It could turn out 
that what should primarily be prioritised within the system, 
given such considerations, has the side-effect that patients 
unable to return to or enter into production, get resources at 
the expense of less severely affected patients who can resume 
productivity. Over time, fewer resources are generated for 
the healthcare system, which eventually might affect access 
to treatment for those most severely affected. This ethical 
approach seems therefore untenable and counterproductive 
of its own intentions. In order to avoid this, we introduce 
another consideration, ie, the need to generate resources. 
However, this is not part of our original set of considerations 
for deciding a ranking, but a later add-on.
A more upright and transparent approach would be to 
include the full set of considerations in the original ranking 
– to the extent that it is possible. For example, allow 
productivity concerns to enter into the equation and partly 
guide the ranking, parallel to aspects such as severity and 
cost-effectiveness. One way could be to allow for productivity 
concerns in the cost-effectiveness assessment. But obviously 
it could also be done by allowing productivity effects to be 
factored in as yet another concern, besides severity and cost-
effectiveness (or whatever list of ethical and other concerns 
we base our ranking on). The productivity effects could be 
weighted according to their considered societal importance 
and resource implications.
Are there any reasons to have a double standard or not 
be transparent and explicit about the need to generate 
resources for healthcare? First, it might be difficult to factor 
in productivity concerns in the original ranking – since 
productivity effects might not be transparent until the ranking 
is done. However, this could be solved by doing the ranking 
in two steps – but still have productivity concerns as part of 
the set of considerations. Second, there might be an ambition 
to uphold a more “ideal” version of priority concerns to 
be explicitly taken into account – perhaps for legitimacy 
concerns (see below). However, RELCOV is an indistinct 
instrument, not necessarily with the effect of targeting 
patient groups where the productivity effects are the greatest, 
or sufficient to uphold reasonable healthcare funding. An 
alternative to RELCOV could be more targeted approaches. 
That is, generally applying RATBOT, but singling out groups 
essential to get back into production. The needed resources 
should be taken from groups/interventions just above the 
rationing limit (patient groups who are then not candidates 
for getting back into production).
A potential problem by systematically and openly taking into 
account the ability to generate resources for healthcare is that 
it will, explicitly, disadvantage old age pensioners, people 
with certain disabilities etc, who are not, or less able to be 
productive in this sense (even with treatment). However, they 
are also likely to be disadvantaged if the resource problem 
in healthcare is emphasised and if they are unlucky, they 
might also be disadvantaged by using RELCOV as a means 
to generate resources. Hence, an explicit or targeted approach 
might also be the best option from their perspective, all things 
considered.
The last reason explored in the above analysis, was the need 
to acquire public acceptance for priority setting, at least in 
publicly financed and politically driven healthcare systems. 
Often, when arguing that there is a need for priority setting 
based on ethically well-founded guiding principles or 
aspects, transparency is viewed as essential. In cases where 
explicit principles are applied, these are often the result of 
political democratic decision-making (eg, the principles in 
Sweden and Norway).3,4 In such situations, using a RELCOV 
approach would be at odds with the explicit principles or 
aspects democratically adopted as normative, in order to 
make priority setting legitimate among the public. This voices 
once again a problematic double standard in the healthcare 
system. That is, if there is general public acceptance of the 
guiding ethical aspects or principles, and of recognising 
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their implications when applied - these principles should be 
transparently applied and the public held to its word. If not, 
there are reasons to revise/readjust the guiding principles or 
aspects. 
Obviously, this represents an ideal of trying to find a rationally 
consistent application of ethical and other considerations in 
different cases, not necessarily reflected in public opinion. 
First, as has been noted in the long philosophical debate on 
particularism, it might be an ideal in the sense that it seems 
impossible to formulate principles and aspects that will be 
acceptable in, or solve, all the different situations encountered. 
This is due to the complexity of our moral reality.23 Second, 
such an ideal rests on the acceptance of impartiality, ie, people 
accepting ethical principles etc. even if the application of 
these principles will disadvantage them in specific situations 
– something we might not always be psychologically prone to 
do.24,25 Given this, using the form of RELCOV, where patients 
at all ranking levels have a chance of some treatment, even if 
the chance increases with rank, might be our best option to 
get democratic acceptance for priority setting.
It should then be noted that if using RELCOV is required to 
buy public support, this is bought at the cost of not funding 
higher ranked treatment, thereby not reflecting the explicit 
(and democratically accepted) set of considerations. Following 
the reasoning in relation to resource generation, it can also 
be bought at the cost of better ways to ensure that the total 
bulk of resources for distribution is as large as possible. To 
put it bluntly, public support might then be bought at the cost 
of lower and less ethically justified (in terms of distributive 
justice) public health.
Concluding Remarks and Implications for Policy
In this article different translations of a ranking list into 
resource distribution are analysed, and it is argued that 
they have different normative implications. Accepting that 
ethical considerations should guide a ranking of conditions 
and treatments, there are strong reasons to use rationing 
from the bottom when translating this ranking into resource 
distribution, rather than applying relative coverage, given an 
ideal ranking. A number of reasons could potentially support 
relative coverage; non-ideal ranking, enabling people to have 
a chance of treatment, distinguishing between the individual 
and group levels, and productivity concerns, could all support 
deviations from a strict rationing from the bottom approach. 
However, they still do not support a general relative coverage 
approach and it should be observed that they seem to support 
different relative coverage schemes. 
The strongest support for a relative coverage approach is 
found in the argument of public support for priority setting, 
unless the public can be convinced to accept the implications 
of the general ethical principles and other considerations they 
find relevant to take into account. However, such support 
is bought at the cost of downplaying more central ethical 
considerations and possibly also at the expense of general 
public health.
From a policy perspective, the analysis shows that to the 
extent priority setting is done through ranking, it does matter 
how such a ranking is implemented into a coverage scheme 
– if the background set of considerations are taken seriously. 
To the extent policy makers want to be explicit and consistent 
in how priority setting is done, “mismatches” between this set 
and the coverage scheme need to be explained and given a 
proper rationale. The analysis shows that different rationales 
for digressing from RATBOT into RELCOV, do support 
different versions of RELCOV. Moreover, often the reasons 
supporting RELCOV will provide even stronger support for 
more targeted and explicit approaches.
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Endnotes 
[1] An important insight into priority setting is that different technologies should 
often have different priorities in relation to different conditions, due to differences 
in severity of the condition or effect of the treatment given the condition etc. 
However, for simplicity I will henceforth talk in terms of prioritising technologies 
(but implying that they are related to specific conditions).
[2] There might be more ideas regarding this, but in this article I will focus on 
these two different ideas and just claim that I think the reasoning in this article 
can be generalised to also cover such ideas.
[3] “Rationing” will, in this context, mean that access to a certain technology 
is limited for patients in need of that technology, despite being on balance 
effective. Rationing might imply that people get limited access but also that 
they get no access at all to the technology. In this context, it is mainly used to 
indicate no access.
[4] The available budget remains at 300 000 €.
[5] I owe this point to a comment at the Priorities 2016 conference in Birmingham.
[6] This might not be entirely true, since the budget constraint might have us 
draw the line within a certain ranking order.
[7] I owe this point to a comment at the Priorities 2016 conference in Birmingham.
[8] Personal communication by Douglas Lundin, chief economist at the Swedish 
Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency.
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